

BATTLE OF STALINGRAD



Presented by:

Syndicate No 20

Intake 37

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We declare that this does document not incorporate, without acknowledgement, any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university and to the best of our knowledge and belief, it does not contain any material previously published and written by another person but by the members of the syndicate group, except where due reference is made in text. We also hereby give consent for our presentation, to be made available to the proper references.

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THE BATTLE OF STALINGRAD

INTRODUCTION

01. The *Battle of Stalingrad* fought from 23 August 1942 to 2 February 1943. It was a major battle on the Eastern Front of World War II in which Nazi Germany lost one fourth of its Eastern Front forces fought in the Soviet Union for control of the city of Stalingrad (now Volgograd) in Southern Russia, on the eastern boundary of Europe. For both Stalin and Hitler, the battle of Stalingrad became a prestige issue over the actual strategic significance of the battle when considering their fame.

02. The battle was marked by its fierce close quarters combat and direct assaults on civilians by air raids. It is often regarded as one of the single largest (nearly 2.2 million personnel) and bloodiest (1.7–2 million wounded, killed or captured) battles in the history of warfare. German forces could never regain the initiative in the East and had to withdraw a vast military force from the West to replace their losses (Limbach).

03. The German offensive to capture Stalingrad began in August 1942, using the German 6th Army and elements of the 4th Panzer Army. The attack was immensely supported by intensive German Air Force called as *Luftwaffe*. The fighting developed into a house-to-house fighting, and both sides poured massive reinforcements into the city. By mid-November 1942, the Germans had pushed the Soviet defenders back at great cost into narrow zones along the west bank of the Volga River (Johnson 2021).

04. On 19 November 1942, the Red Army launched Operation Uranus, two-frontal attacks targeting the weaker Romanian and Hungarian armies protecting the German 6th Army's flanks. The Axis forces on the flanks were overrun and cut off and surrounded in the Stalingrad area. The battle lasted five months, one week, and three days (Johnson 2017).

05. The Axis forces were never able to recover their losses and were eventually forced into a long retreat out of Eastern Europe. For the Soviets, who also suffered great losses during the battle, the victory at Stalingrad marked the start of the liberation of the Soviet Union (Hansen 2019).


AIM

06. The aim of this presentation is to carry out a detailed analysis of the battle of Stalingrad.

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TOPOGRAPHY AND BACKGROUND TO THE BATTLE**TOPOGRAPHY**

07. The Battle of Stalingrad was one of the most important battles of World War Two and took place between 1942 and 1943 in a region some 560 miles from Moscow and 1400 miles from Berlin. The area in general between the Rivers Don and Volga is steppe; slightly rolling terrain of dry, rough grass, broken by gullies suitable for armored maneuver but narrowing in space towards city. The River Don is a major industrial transit route joining the Black Sea near Rostov. The river Volga ranges from 500 to 1500 yards in width at Stalingrad and is a substantial obstacle. Capture of the Volga by German troops would disrupt commercial river traffic.

**BACKGROUND TO THE BATTLE**

08. Hitler was able capture vast expanses of territory, including Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic republics by the Spring of 1942 by conducting Operation Barbarossa. Germans were able to reach nearly fifteen miles near to Moscow with heavy casualties to German Army Group Centre. Hitler was confident that he could suppress the Red Army after the winter of 1942 and Stalin was expecting the main thrust of the German summer attacks to be directed against Moscow again.

09. Hitler rewrote the operational objectives for the 1942 campaign. Initial objectives were to destroy the industrial region around Stalingrad.

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RELATIVE STRENGTH AND OPPOSING PLANS

RELATIVE STRENGTH

10. As German forces approached Stalingrad, a build-up of Soviet troops in the area. The number of troops employed was significant. The German forces consisted of:

- a. 6th Army.
- b. 4th Panzer Army.
- c. The Italian 8th Army.
- d. The Romanian 3rd Army.
- e. The Romanian 4th Army
- f. The Hungarian 2nd Army.
- g. 369th Croatian Reinforced Infantry Regiment.
- h. 36th Estonian Police Battalion.

11. The Soviets in Stalingrad initially faced the Germans with a composite Army under the command of General Chuikov. But as the campaign progressed the Soviets utilised a total of seven Armies under Field Marshal Yeremenko, Commander of the Stalingrad Front. Overall operational command lay with Field Marshal Zhukov. The breakdown of Soviet troops employed was:

- a. 28th Army.
- b. 51st Army.
- c. 57th Army.
- d. 62nd Army (Commanded by General Chuikov in Stalingrad).
- e. 64th Army.
- f. Don Front.
- g. Southwestern Front.

12. Total Strength of Opposing Forces. On the Stalingrad front the troops facing each other and the equipment's were as follows:

Ser	German/Axis Forces	Soviet Forces
(a)	(b)	(c)
1.	270,000 personnel	187,000 personnel
2.	3,000 artillery pieces	2,200 artillery pieces
3.	500 tanks	400 tanks
4.	600 aircraft, 1,600 by mid-September	300 aircraft
5.	At the time of the Soviet counteroffensive:	At the time of the Soviet counteroffensive:
6.	1,040,000 men (400,000+ Germans, 220,000 Italians, 143,296 Romanians, 200,000 Hungarians)	1,143,000
8.	732 (402 operational) aircraft	1,115 aircraft

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CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE

GERMAN ATTACK PLAN

13. German military doctrine was based on the principle of combined-arms teams and close cooperation between tanks, infantry, engineers, artillery and ground-attack aircraft which called as the *Blitzkrieg*.

OPERATION FALL BLAU (CASE BLUE)

14. The Operation Fall Blue planned summer offensive was to conduct a sprint through the southern Russian steppes into the Caucasus to capture the vital Soviet oil fields there. It was to include the German 6th, 17th, 4th Panzer and 1st Panzer Armies. Army Group South spearhead the offensive which overran the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1941 during Operation Barbarosa.

15. Hitler's plans for the Soviet invasion of Stalingrad were to be carried out by Army Group South and Army Group North under the command of General Wilhelm List, with 17th Army and First Panzer Army. Army Group A was to continue advancing south towards the Caucasus while Army Group B was to move east towards the Volga and Stalingrad. Army Group South began its attack into southern Russia on 28 June 1942. Initial German attack attempted to take the city in a rush. 1,000 tons of bombs were dropped in 48 hours, more than in London at the height of the Blitz. By 12 September, the Soviet 62nd Army had been reduced to 90 tanks, 700 mortars and just 20,000 personnel (Johnson 2017)

ENCIRCLEMENT OF GERMAN FORCES

16. Adolf Hitler declared in a public speech on 30 September 1942 that the German army would never leave the city of Stalingrad. At a meeting shortly after the Soviet encirclement, German army chiefs pushed for an immediate breakout. Hitler was told by the head of German Air Force the Luftwaffe could supply the 6th Army with an "air bridge" This would allow the Germans in the city to fight on temporarily while a relief force was assembled.

OPERATION WINTER STORM

17. German commander General Erich Paulus refused to abandon Stalingrad, concerned about Red Army attacks on the flank of Army Group Don and Army Group B in their development on Rostov-on-Don. Operation Winter Storm was conducted by the Germans to attempt to relieve the trapped army from the south. Aim was to win as much time as possible to withdraw forces from the Caucasus and to rush troops from other Fronts to form a new front.

THE FAILED AIR BRIDGE

18. The Luftwaffe's failure to provide its transport units with the tools they needed to maintain an adequate count of operational aircraft contributed to the failure of the 6th Army. The Germans were now starving, and running out of ammunition. Nevertheless, they continued to resist, in part because they believed the Soviets would execute any who surrendered.

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THE URBAN WARFARE

19. Towards the end of the war Soviets were surprised by the number of Germans they had trapped, by their encircling troops. Bloody urban warfare began again in Stalingrad, but this time it was the Germans who were pushed back to the banks of the Volga. The Germans adopted a simple defense of fixing wire nets over all windows to protect themselves from grenades. The Soviets responded by fixing fishhooks to the grenades, so they stuck to the nets when thrown.

20. By this time Germans had no usable tanks in the city, and those that still functioned could were very less. The Soviets did not bother employing tanks in areas where the urban destruction restricted their mobility. Soviet informed General Paulus: if he surrendered within 24 hours, he would receive a guarantee of safety for all prisoners, medical care for the sick and wounded, prisoners being allowed to keep their personal belongings; but Paulus was ordered not to surrender by Hitler.

21. On 22 January Paulus requested that he be granted permission to surrender. Hitler rejected it on a point of honor. By 26 January 1943, the German forces inside Stalingrad were split into two pockets north and south of Mamai-Kurgan hill. Now "each part of the cauldron came personally under Hitler".

THE SURRENDER OF GENERAL FIELD MARSHALL

22. Stalin's Order No. 227 of 27 July 1942 decreed that all commanders who ordered unauthorized retreat would be subject to a military tribunal. Through brutal pressure for self-sacrifice, thousands of deserters and presumed malingerers were captured or executed to discipline the troops. At Stalingrad, it is estimated that 14,000 soldiers of the Red Army were executed in order to keep the formation. "Not!" and "*There is no land behind the Volga!*" were the slogans. The Germans pushing forward into Stalingrad suffered heavy casualties.

23. Stalin prevented civilians from leaving the city in the belief that their presence would encourage greater resistance from the city's defenders. Civilians, including women and children, were put to work building trenchworks and protective fortifications. The civilians were often sent into battle without rifles. After German intentions became clear in July 1942, Stalin appointed Field Marshal Andrey Yeryomenko as commander of the South-eastern Front and Commissar Nikita Khrushchev were tasked with planning the defence of Stalingrad. The eastern border of Stalingrad was the wide River Volga, and over the river, additional Soviet units were deployed which placed under the command of Lieutenant General Vasiliy Chuikov on 11 September 1942.

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RUSSIAN DEFENCE PLAN

24. The Germans made slow but steady progress through the city. Positions were taken individually, but the Germans were never able to capture the key crossing points along the riverbank. By 27 September, the Germans occupied the southern portion of the city, but the Soviets held the center and northern part. Most importantly, the Soviets controlled the ferries to their supplies on the east bank of the Volga.

SOVIET BRIDGE HEADS ALONG THE RIVER VOLGA

25. Axis forces had neglected for months to consolidate their positions along the natural defensive line of the Don River. The Soviet forces were allowed to retain bridgeheads on the right bank from which offensive operations could be quickly launched. Soviet forces offered little resistance in the vast empty steppes and started streaming eastward. Several attempts to re-establish a defensive line failed when German units outflanked them.

DEFENDING THE CITY OR DIE IN ATTEMPTING

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27. Stalin prevented civilians from leaving the city in the belief that their presence would encourage greater resistance from the city's defenders. Civilians, including women and children, were put to work building trenchworks and protective fortifications. The civilians were often sent into battle without rifles. The 62nd Army's mission was to defend. By 1 September, the Soviets could only reinforce and supply their forces via crossings of the Volga under constant bombardment by artillery and aircraft. Staff and students from a local university formed a "tank destroyer" unit to produce T-34 tanks for use on the front line.

THE URBAN WAREFARE

28. Red Army Commanders adopted the tactic of always keeping their front-line positions as close as possible to the Germans, which was as called "hugging" the Germans. They converted multi-floored apartment blocks and factories into of well defended strongpoints with small 5–10-man units and weapons. Manpower in the city was constantly refreshed by bringing additional troops over the Volga.

29. The Germans, called this unseen urban warfare as "Rat War", considered like *capturing the kitchen but still fighting for the living room and the bedroom*. The fight was continued to every ruin, street, factory, house, basement, and staircase. Even the sewers were the sites of firefights. In every block, basements and apartment, Germans had to clear buildings room by room. The 62nd Army's mission was to defend. By 1 September, the Soviets could only reinforce and supply their forces via

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OPERATION URANUS

30. On 19 November 1942, the Red Army launched Operation Uranus which lasted till 23 November and led to the encirclement of the German Sixth Army, the Third and Fourth Romanian armies, and portions of the Nazi Fourth Panzer Army. The operation formed part of the ongoing Battle of Stalingrad, and was aimed at destroying German forces in and around the city.

31. Soviet units in World War II consisted of three complete armies, 1st Guards Army, 5th Tank Army, and 21st Army, including a total of 18 infantry divisions, 8 tank brigades, 2 motorized brigades and 6 cavalry divisions. Red Army took advantage of poor preparation for winter and the disadvantage of Romanian army who were deployed in exposed positions, outnumbered, and poorly equipped.

OPERATION LITTLE SATURN

32. On 16 December 1941, Soviet troops crossed the Don and attacked the Italian Cosseria and Ravenna Divisions. The Italians initially fought well, with the Germans praising the quality of the Italian defenders. On 19 December, with Italian lines disintegrating, Italian headquarters ordered the battered divisions to withdraw to new lines.

33. The fighting forced a total reevaluation of the German situation. The attempt to break through to Stalingrad was abandoned and Army Group A was ordered to pull back from the Caucasus. The 6th Army now was beyond all hope of German relief. While a motorised breakout might have been possible in the first few weeks, the 6th Army now had insufficient fuel and the German soldiers would have faced great difficulty breaking through the Soviet lines on foot in harsh winter conditions. But in its defensive position on the Volga, 6th Army continued to tie down a significant number of Soviet Armies.

THE LOSS OF AIRFIELDS

34. The loss of the two airfields was the end to air supplies and evacuation of the wounded. After 23 January, there were no more reported landings, just random air drops of ammunition and food until the end of the war. Around 91,000 exhausted, ill, wounded, and starving prisoners were taken, including 3,000 Romanians, and 22 generals.

SOVIET VICTORY

35. The Germans despite starving and running out of ammo continued to resist stubbornly. The Soviets, in turn, were initially surprised by the large number of German forces they had trapped and had to reinforce their encirclement to gain territory. Soviet forces closed in on General Paulus' last command post, a cellar in the bombed-out ruins of the Univermag Department Store. Of the nearly three hundred fifty thousand men who had followed him to Stalingrad and only ninety thousand survived to surrender.

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36. Stalin waited a day until surrender arrangements were secure and it could be confirmed that General Paulus was alive and in custody before the Soviet government proudly announced their incredible victory to an astonished world on 1 February 1943. A shocked German nation woke to hear the following message. *“The battle of Stalingrad has ended. True to their oath to fight to the last breath, the Sixth Army under the exemplary leadership of Field-Marshal Paulus has been overcome by the superiority of the enemy and by the unfavourable circumstances confronting our forces.”*

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APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES OF WAR IN THE BATTLE

SELECTION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE AIM

37. In German's Point of View. Germans were unable to maintain their aim throughout the operation during the following occasions resulted the Army Group South to pay a huge cost.
- a. Hitler intervenes to the operation Blue at the very outset by splitting the Army Group South in to two as Army Group South (A) and South (B) which was a one entity during the Operation Barbarossa. This created doubts among German Generals for the firm maintenance of Combat Service Support to wage the war in Eastern Front.
 - b. Hitler again intervenes to operation Blue by ordering the 4th Panzer Army to join Army Group South (A) to the south which was initially allocated to Army Group South (B) which resulted a massive traffic jam and slowed the German advance from 1 week which intern gave more time for Soviet to be prepared at Stalingrad.
38. From the very beginning the Soviet had maintained their aim throughout the course even causing huge casualties. Although the tide and the situation changed Soviets engaged in the same aim which indeed well-known even to every civilian to give their best to defend the city at any cost.

MAINTENANCE OF MORALE

39. Napoleon dictum was justified during the operation Blau such that 'morale is to material is to one' which probably the single most important element of war. At the very beginning of operation blau the Germans entered the battle with fresh and firm supply of logistics which incorporated with Blitzkrieg tactics caused huge success during the initial phase by boosting the morale of soldiers as such.
- a. When Army Group A was pushing far into the Caucasus, their advance slowed as supply lines grew overextended. The two German army groups were not positioned to support one another due to the great distances involved.
 - b. A significant impact on the German's ability to facilitate resupply and the failed air bridge caused during the loss of the two airfields, at Pitomnik, Gumrak directly impacted to loosen the morale of German soldiers due to the lack of supply of ammunition, winter clothes, food and medicine.
40. Stalin's order to retain the civilians in the city during the battle and their incorporated competent skills and techniques used to fight in the urban environment were key to its success.

OFFENSIVE ACTION

41. Hitler's Blitzkrieg tactics bought attacking the least obvious point, punching through, and then maintaining a highly mobile offensive to keep the enemy off balance. This was a huge success in the

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point of Germans only till the advance up to the city of Stalingrad where they were forced to fight using vehicles instead of tanks.

42. Soviet commanders adopted the tactics called "Hugging up" were, always keeping the front line as close to the Germans as physically possible. This limited the Germans using their Armour, Artillery, and air force in combined with the infantry. Soviets conducted active counter attacks at all levels to always maintain the offensive action.

CONCENTRATION OF FORCE

43. Germans adopted the maximum and optimum allocation of force to the main effort till the large stage of battle of Stalingrad which allowed to strike into deep into Soviets and make them off balance. Germans integrated the Army Group South with Motorized Infantry, Panzer army, Artillery and air force with precise coordination to achieve Blitzkrieg tactics.

44. General Zhukov launched the operation Uranus by concentrating massive Soviet forces in the steppes to the north and south of the city to encircle the 6th Army by attacking on the northern flank which defended by Italian, Hungarian and Rumanian units.

45. Stalin concentrated maximum Soviet forces to his main effort of defending the Stalingrad at any cost by inspiring and forcing armies and civilians to be actively participated in the battle. Where the self-sacrifice was an honour considered which resulted of forming sniper divisions, civil nursing organizations and the Peoples communist guards.

SECURITY

46. The Germans were unable to maintain the active measures which encompasses the security achieves the aim of capturing and holding of Stalingrad during the battle of Blue due to as follows:

- a. Germans were unable to defend their bases and entry points when considering the loosing of Bridge heads at river Don and airfields at Pitomnik, Gumrak and Stalingradskaya.
- b. Germans could not maintain the favourable air situation due to the lack of airfield during the Soviet Encirclement by operation Uranus.
- c. The firm protection on flanks guarded by Romanian army was lost by the Operation Uranus conducted by the Soviet 1st Guards Army, 5th Tank Army, and 21st Army which caused the encirclement of Germans.
- d. Due to the over waging war in both Stalingrad and Carcass fronts Germans were unable to maintain adequate a reserve which collapsed the Army Group South (A) and Army Group South (B).

47. Soviets were pumping massive manpower across the river Volga to wage the war by the Stalin's Order No. 227 of 27 July 1942 which authorized for the military tribunal against the deserters and a brutal pressure for self-sacrifice provided the adequate reserves for Soviets by stating the slogans such as *"Not a step back!"*, *"There is no land behind the Volga!"*.

COOPERATION

48. Soviets demonstrated remarkable coordination among the civil authorities and armoured forces. The nationalist ideology of Soviets provided the massive human factor to defend the Stalingrad. The tractor factory provided tanks which were directly drove to the battle by factory workers. Germans adopted this principal to its maximum till the last edge of the battle.

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APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATION

FORESIGHT

49. The administrative plan is the lengthy process, and it must start well before the commencement of an operation to foresee the requirements for men and material. Logisticians to have the ability to continue the supply of combat supply to the battlefield.

50. Stalingrad was far away from German's home front as it was extremely hard to supply logistics to German forces. There were 350 tons of supplies needed every day, but they never managed supply more than 80 tons, since the supply aircraft kept being shot down. Red Army foresight had adopted a new strategy to minimize losses of logistics supply. Fuel is the most critical factor of any battle, as Battle of Stalingrad called 'the Great Battle for Great Oil'. Hitler imagined that capture the city was highly benefited to develop war against the Soviet. Red Army drew Germans deeper into Soviet, thereby able to cut off German's ground supply lines. Further Germans infantry troops suffered food and ammunition shortage. These situations caused to fail Germany in the battle.

ECONOMY

51. Resources will seldom be plentiful. It is therefore essential that the most efficient use is made of all the available manpower, material, and movement facilities and that any tendency towards over insurance is resisted. Therefore, maintenance of the economy utmost important to sustain in the battle.

52. German Army refrained maintain huge logistics backup from the mainland. Red Army acquires the German logistics plan and destroys anything of value. Getting supplies to the troops became exceedingly difficult, especially given the enormous lengths of supply and size of the front. Finally Soviet resistance was incredibly fierce which hampered supply further to the German Army. Three consistent bottlenecks in arms production plagued Germany throughout the war. There was never sufficient production of high-grade steel for armaments production. The pre-war system of individual contributions to the economy served to disperse the existing industry. The shortage of skilled labour was continually aggravated by conscription. The German war economy grew tremendously during 1941 to 1943, but ultimately that growth was not sufficient to meet the constantly increasing demand.

FLEXIBILITY

53. Flexibility in the field of logistics means the ability to confirm the tactical plan which will almost inevitably, be subjected to frequent change. Adolf Hitler not considered about the logistics in the Battle of Stalingrad. It was proved one of the main reasons to fail Stalingrad was violating the principle of flexibility. Complicated plans, lack of alternatives and highly depend on the airlifts seems to be the main factors. Red Army adopted a flexible administrative plan by taking own ground advantage.

54. Germans tactical plan changed, without proper evaluation of the logistics plan. Poor flexible logistics plan caused to fail the battle.

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55. Heavy fighting in builds up made more demand for logistics supply. If Moscow logistics route cut off by Nazi Army, logistics backup failed or unsustainable for Soviet troops. Soviet force applied accurate logistics plan, by identifying the importance of flexible to switch alternative means. Flexible logistics backup for Stalingrad and oil field at Caucasus were one of the reasons for success behind the Soviet.

SIMPLICITY

56. The easier is understood and the better it can be adapted to meet changing circumstances. Although the administration is a complex and detailed subject, its application is largely a matter of common sense and a logical approach to the problem. Simple yet flexible plans will have a greater chance of success than the more complicated.

57. Logistics supplies is an integrated part of the planning, preparation, and execution of an operation and it is the responsibility of commanders at all levels. German logistics plan was to acquire resources from invaded lands and huge logistics backup from the mainland by air and road. Red Army applied simple alternative logistics means to address the circumstance and it causes the success of the battle.

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APPLICATION OF FUNCTIONS OF COMBAT

COMMAND

1. Command is the authority vested in an individual for the direction, coordination and control of military forces. When considering the Germans point of view the adopted the mission command at the lower level, but in higher level it was a centralized command in such which affected the overall result of the Eastern Front. Hitler intervened twice to the operation Blue by splitting the Army group and trying to change the ORBAT by changing the course of 4th Panzer Army.

2. Soviet soldiers executed the mission command up to the grass foot level by decentralizing the command and allowing them the freedom of action to achieve the aim of defending Stalingrad. Due to the scarcity of communications the soldiers had to operate individually and with their own initiative. They operated successfully in an urban environment against a well-advanced enemy, the Germans.

MANOEUVRE

3. Manoeuvre is principally a product of movement and firepower used to gain position of advantage relative to the enemy which should be taken place in conjunction with fire or fire on call. At the very concept of operating Germans are fully fledged with the firepower coordinated by air, armour and artillery and the movement specially by armour and motorized infantry. This was the success behind the German war winning capability, as such called as the *Blitzkrieg* tactics. But during the urban warfare at Stalingrad Germans were limited to use their assets such as air, armour and artillery as Soviets adopted the method of Hugging up which was bold move done by the Lieutenant General Vasilii Chuikov.

FIREPOWER

4. The primary role of firepower is to facilitate manoeuvre by shattering the enemy's will or undermining his cohesion. Germans adopted this successfully till they enter to the urban warfare at Stalingrad. Some 1,000 tons of bombs were dropped in 48 hours, more than in London at the height of the Blitz.

5. Though Soviets were hampered by the Germans they had much limited firepower which cause considerable damage to the Germans. During the operation Uranus Soviets used 1st Guards Army, 5th Tank Army, and 21st Army, including a total of 18 infantry divisions, eight tank brigades, two motorized brigades, six cavalry divisions and one anti-tank brigade to conduct flank attack for the encirclement of Germans.

PROTECTION

6. The Soviet tactic of 'fixing' the enemy and destroying him before he can attack has been used extensively by the Soviets to defend Stalingrad during World War II. The concept was adopted from a similar one used by the Germans to protect their main supply depot over River Don at Kalach-na-Donu in 1944.

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INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE

7. Success in combat is dependent on the possession of accurate and timely intelligence. The Germans underestimated the Soviets with the less resistant at the very beginning of Operation Blue when sprinting across Soviet steppes. The Soviets demonstrated vice - versa behaviour as such that they developed a responsible intelligence network by the time they conduct operation Uranus and little Saturn.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

8. Combat service support (CSS) is an integrated part of any operation and is the responsibility of commanders at all levels. In a German Panzer Army one tank is supported by three CSS vehicles. Germans faced difficulties when adopting to urban warfare at Stalingrad which got worse due to the failed air bridge to the troops at Kessel.

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LOGISTICS BACKUP

58. Combat Service Support (CSS) is an integrated part of the planning, preparation, and execution of any operation and is the responsibility of commanders at all levels. In a German Panzer Army, one tank is supported by three CSS vehicles. Germans were unprepared for the winter especially Romanian Army at the flanks which provided less resistance during Operation Uranus.

59. The Red Army identified the importance of logistics backup than the Germans. Hitler had a complicated logistics plan due to overconfidence, but Red Army applied simple system. The Red Army used watercraft across Lake Ladoga to achieve means of transport during the warmer months and land vehicles drove over thick ice during winter. Vital food supplies were transferred and transported over 45 km via a small suburban railway to Stalingrad.

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LESSONS LEARNT

60. For the successful conduct of every military operation it is essential to select and define the aims clearly which is absolute, very precise and expressed in broad terms. Once the aim is decided it must be circulated widely to be known by each subordinate.
61. Morale being a very important element of war to be maintained by the sound administration, trustworthy leadership discipline and self-respect to wage the war successfully.
62. Commanders need to adopt offensive action as much as possible to influence the outcome of the battle which would create the confidence on own troops and to establish an ascendancy over the enemy.
63. Concentration of Force on the main effort to be adopted which need to win battles and demands good communications and efficient traffic control system.
64. Any military operation requires a certain degree of security which will enable own forces to achieve their aim despite the enemy's interference. Mainly achieved by defencing of bases and entry points, maintenance of favourable air situation, the protection of flanks to secure freedom of action and maintain an adequate reserve.
65. For the successful waging of war cooperation between all arms and services within the Army, between the fighting Services and with the civil and other government authorities is mandatory.
66. Commander should be provided with the latest information to make decisions, sound communication to acquire information and to promulgate decisions and control to coordinate and monitor his assets and the actions of his force.
67. All commanders should be provided with sustainable assets to conduct movement in conjunction with the fire or with fire on call.
68. All commanders should be provided with accurate and timely intelligence to achieve the success in a battle.
69. Combat Service Support should be a in integrated part of the planning, preparation and execution of any operation and it is the responsibility of commanders at all levels.

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CONCLUSION

70. The battle of Stalingrad was of the largest battle fought in the Eastern Front. It raged for 199 days. The devastating casualties marked its brutality within a small period. There the battle hardened; technologically advanced Germans were defeated by not letting down city of Stalingrad. This battle opened new era of modern battlefield like effective employment of snipers in the urban warfare. Soviets were highly depended on the manpower which pumped constantly across the river Volga. The life expectancy of Soviet officer was nearly three days and for the Germans it was three days. This battle demonstrated the ineffective application of famous German Blitzkrieg tactics and the effective use of Red Army's hugging up method. Hence a disastrous battle came to an end causing massive human and material costs with valuable lesson to the humans.

71. Total numbers of casualties were difficult to compile due to the vast scope of the battle. The Stalingrad campaign, in analysis shall always remain a historical military encounter where human endurance was not only tested to the full but also over- stretched to its breakable limit. Besides being a turning point in the war, Stalingrad was also revealing of the discipline and determination of both the Germans and the Soviet Red Army. The Soviets first defended Stalingrad against a fierce German onslaught. So great were Soviet losses at that times, the life expectancy of a newly arrived soldier was less than a day, and the life expectancy of a Soviet officer was three days.

72. It was the first time that it had operated under adverse condition on such a scale. During the latter part of the siege, short of food and clothing, many German soldiers starved or froze to death. Yet, discipline was maintained until the very end, when resistance no longer served any useful purpose. Some experts hold that the German defeat at Stalingrad heralded the end of German designs in the East and led to their inevitable defeat. Hitler attempted to achieve unlimited aims with limited means and failed badly. What is certain is that human endurance was tested to its limit and beyond. Industrial war in its full paradigm ensued as both sides fought an attrition battle in which the Soviets, after initial reverses, increasingly held all the cards.

73. Due to a variety of circumstances the Germans faced a slow, but inevitable defeat at the hands of staunch Soviet defence. Tactically, the lessons of Stalingrad were developed in blood and tested under the most trying of circumstances. The tactical lessons still bear up under scrutiny today, particularly as modern warfare becomes ever more entrenched in the urban environment. Nevertheless, it was the lessons learnt at the operational and strategic levels that hold most value. What is clear in the modern paradigm of 'war amongst the people' one must heed the lessons of Stalingrad from both the victors and defeated aspects. Failure to heed the lessons is to seek defeat.

72. The Battle of Stalingrad is one of the best examples to examine the impact of Logistics Supply on the success of the battle. It demonstrated how importance applies principles of administration to the real ground. The Battle of Stalingrad will always remain a historic military encounter as a classic example of courage, determination, and impact of logistics supply to the success of the battle.

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